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Abstract 
What accounts for the instability of economic voting? Contextual factors assumed so far 
to affect this relationship include the degree of control over the economy exerted by 
governments, their partisan-ideological composition, or even voters’ experience with 
democratic elections. In this paper, we provide an alternative account. Based on a vast 
literature originating in social and organizational psychology, we propose the existence of 
a process-outcome interaction: short-term outcomes matter, but the weight voters assign 
to them depends on the extent to which governance is perceived to adhere to principles of 
procedural fairness. Based on data on twenty years of elections in the OECD countries, 
we show that the strength of the relationship between GDP growth and the share of the 
vote for the incumbent parties does depends on the perceived procedural fairness in 
governance. We conduct extensive robustness tests, including the use of alternative 
indicators of fairness and survey data. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between the economy and the electoral performance of incumbents has 
been the object of literally hundreds of studies in many democracies. As a result, we 
know, on the one hand, that such relationship seems to be “powerful” (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000: 211). But we also know, on the other hand, that such result is “sadly 
lacking in stability” (Paldam 1991: 9). In a very recent study, covering a total of 86 
countries, the same predicament emerges: “although there is a long literature on the effect 
of economic growth in elections, we found little to suggest a global rule (…), suggesting 
that the effects of economic factors are moderated by country-specific factors.” 
(Kennedy, Wojcik, and Lazer 2017: 518).  
 
What accounts for this lack of robustness in economic voting? One direction of research 
has been to examine the heterogeneous responses of different types of voters, depending, 
for example, on their partisanship or level of sophistication, to economic performance.2 
Another direction has been precisely to uncover those “country-specific factors” that 
moderate the effect of the economy. In this work, we take the latter perspective. The 
prevalent view in the literature in this regard is that the instability in economic voting is 
explained by the fact that incumbents control the economy to different extents. Lower 
control means lower responsibility for outcomes, which in turn makes it difficult for 
voters to blame or reward governments for past performance (Powell and Whitten 1993) 
or leads them to give more weight to exogenous factors when using past performance to 
select a new incumbent (Duch and Stevenson 2008). As a result, economic voting should 
be blurred under conditions of lower control. The crucial variables in this regard are 
thought to be political and institutional aspects that increase opposition parties’ influence 
in national policymaking (Powell and Whitten 1993; Duch and Stevenson 2008: 277-
286), disperse power across multiple levels of government within a country (Anderson 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Kayser (2014) and Anson and Hellwig (2016) for reviews. 
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2006), as well as levels of economic interdependence that diminish elected policy 
makers’ control over the economy (Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Others 
have also explored the extent to which the effect of different sorts of economic 
developments on the vote for the incumbent parties should depend on the partisan and 
ideological complexion of the government (Swank 1993; Powell and Whitten 1993; 
Carlsen 2000). And others still have pointed out that economic accountability tends to be 
stronger for countries with a shorter a country’s experience with democracy (Hellwig 
2010). 
 
In this work, we propose an alternative approach to the question of the contingency of the 
relationship between economic performance and incumbent vote. The driving force 
behind our approach is a vast literature originating in social and organizational 
psychology, showing that outcome-oriented theories are insufficient to understand 
people’s relationship and satisfaction with authorities. Instead, “what people feel, think, 
and do is determined not only by the outcomes associated with decisions but also by the 
process through which decisions are planned and implemented” (Brockner 2011: 20). 
More specifically, we argue that support for political authorities in general, and voting for 
the incumbent in particular, should be driven not only by what incumbents deliver in 
terms of observable economic outcomes but also by the extent to which voters perceive 
that the way governments make decisions and set policies is characterized by procedural 
fairness. Furthermore, and most crucially for our purposes, we argue that the contingent 
nature of the relationship between economic outcomes and political support derives from 
the fact that voters weigh economic performance differently depending on their 
perceptions of procedural fairness in governance.  
 
In the next section, we present a simple model that helps clarifying our theoretical 
expectations and examine its adherence to extant empirical findings. In section three, we 
perform an empirical analysis of our own, analyzing a time-series cross-section dataset 
comprising national elections in the OECD countries from 1995 to 2015. We show that 
the strength of the relationship between economic performance (real GDP growth) and 
the vote for the incumbent parties is moderated by procedural fairness in governance. We 
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perform a series of robustness tests, including the use of alternative measures of 
procedural fairness, alternative estimation strategies, adding other moderating variables 
to our models, and using pooled cross-national survey data. Section four concludes.  
 
2. A simple model of voting, economic outcomes, and procedural fairness 
 
Let Vt represent the percentage of votes that an incumbent is expected to obtain in an 
election that occurs in t and Xt  an economic outcome that voters care about and can be 
easily observed in the short run, like economic growth. We can express the relationship 
between them with a very simple vote function: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡(𝑋𝑡),          (1) 
 
with 𝜕𝑉𝑡 𝜕𝑋𝑡⁄ > 0, meaning that the better the economic outcomes the higher the 
percentage of votes. This very simple idea is the cornerstone of the economic voting 
approach: “good times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out” (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000: 183). More generally, beneficial outcomes, especially when 
operationalized as objective economic outcomes or perceptions, are strongly predictive of 
all kinds of positive attitudes vis-à-vis authorities and institutions (Armingeon and 
Gutthman 2014: 439). And even more generally, in all kinds of social exchanges, 
including those with authorities, people’s satisfaction seems to increase the more 
immediate outcomes are perceived to be beneficial (Blau 1964; Homans 1961).  
 
Let us now add two additional elements. The first is 𝑋𝑇, which stands for an outcome that 
will only be observable in the long run (T). It may be interpreted as an intangible good (in 
the short run) that it will be materialized in a good economic outcome in the long run, 
like long-term GDP per capita. This can be the result of a policy that only in the long run 
will have impact on economic outcomes, such as, for example, a policy aiming at 
decreasing structural unemployment or promoting education.  
 
𝑃 stands for procedural fairness. In social psychology, procedural fairness has many 
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aspects, which are differently emphasized by different theoretical perspectives. These 
include notions such as the consistency and impartiality of allocation procedures across 
people and across time, the use of all good available information in decisions, the 
compatibility of allocative procedures with fundamental ethical and moral values 
(Leventhal 1980), the opportunity to voice opinions in the decision making-process 
(Thibaut and Walker 1975), the respectful treatment of all parties involved, or the ability 
to generate trust that the decision makers will behave fairly and ethically in the future 
(Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1988). All these are aspects to which people are clearly not 
indifferent and that tend to shape their view of decision-making processes and the 
decision-makers themselves.  The concept is central for other disciplines as well, 
including not only political theory (from Locke to Rawls) but also economics, where the 
term “procedural utility” is employed to capture the notion that people have preferences 
over outcomes but also “preferences about how outcomes are generated” (Frey and 
Stutzer 2005: 92; see also Frey, Benz, and Stutzer 2004).  
 
Including 𝑃 and 𝑋𝑇 𝑖mplies, of course, a more complex utility function. For simplicity, 
we consider a Cobb-Douglas function. Assume that the share of votes of an incumbent 
takes the form 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑋𝑡)
1−𝛽(𝑋𝑇)
𝛽 ,         0 < 𝛽 < 1.      (2) 
 
Note that, in equation (2), the higher the procedural fairness, the higher is the utility 
derived by the elector, for any given set of parameters. This fits well not only with the 
vast social psychology literature on the topic of satisfaction in all kinds of social 
exchanges but also with empirical research on political attitudes and behaviors, which 
suggests that people seem to derive utility not only from tangible outcomes but also from 
the extent to which decisions by policy-makers are reached according to fair procedures. 
For example, attitudes towards political authorities, office-holders and institutions seem 
to be affected by perceptions of fairness in procedures (Tyler and Caine 1981; Tyler, 
Rasinski, and McGraw 1985; Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
1995 and 2002; Farnsworth 2003; Kershaw and Alexander 2003; Carman 2010; see 
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Grimes 2016 for a recent review on political trust). The extent to which public officials 
and decision-making processes are thought to abide to criteria of honesty, ethicality, and 
impartiality are themselves important drivers of political support (Erlingsson, Linde, and 
Öhrvall 2014; Dahlberg & Holmberg 2014). And the same occurs with perceptions of 
corruption in government. As Linde notes, although “public officials acting (…) 
arbitrarily and discriminatingly are unfair, but not necessarily corrupt, (…) corruption 
could be seen as an antithesis to impartiality in general” (Linde 2012: 429). Thus, 
unsurprisingly, high levels of corruption — contravening the most basic aspects of 
procedural fairness in the exercise of public power, such as impartiality and ethicality— 
seem to be responsible not only for decreasing support and trust in regimes and 
institutions (Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer 1998; Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 
2003; Linde 2012; Linde & Erlingsson 2013) but also for driving down support for 
incumbent parties (Welch and Hibbing 1997; Krause and Mendez 2009; Klašnja, Tucker 
and Deegan-Krause 2014; Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits 2016).  
 
We also have 𝑋𝑇. We know from the economics literature that there is a tension between 
𝑋𝑡 and 𝑋𝑇. The most famous one is related to the Phillips curve, which states that, in the 
short run, policy makers may try to explore a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. However, in the long run, as shown by Friedman (1968) and Phelps 
(1967), this tradeoff disappears and only inflation remains. Therefore, according to 
Friedman-Phelps, the sole long-run impact of a policy that, in the short run, decreases 
unemployment, is higher inflation. Kydland and Prescott (1977) then showed that optimal 
monetary policy would not be credible, leading to a short run bias, implying that, in 
equilibrium, there would be excess inflation, while Barro and Gordon (1983) discussed 
what kind of institutions would render the desirable credibility. Similarly, policies that 
increase productivity in the long run may have detrimental short-run effects on 
employment and vice versa. For example, protectionist policies may have short-term 
positive effects and detrimental effects in the long run. Another possible example is 
related with labor market policies. Although increasing labor market flexibility should 
decrease average unemployment in the long run, in the short run the effect may actually 
be an increase the number of unemployed people, as, in a first stage, firms may take 
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advantage of the new laws to get rid of some workers they had been stuck with. 
 
Because 𝑋𝑇 is not easily observable in the short run, trust in the political decision-making 
process and how it produces allocative decisions is essential to assess it. Therefore, in 
equation (2), we will assume that the weight the elector gives to 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑋𝑇 depends on 
the level of 𝑃. (1 − 𝛽) represents the weight that the elector gives to observed outcome, 
while 𝛽 represents the weight given to the intangible outcome 𝑋𝑇. The higher is 𝑃, the 
closer 𝛽 will be to 1: 𝛽′(𝑃) > 0. Thus, the utility derived by the elector increases with Xt, 
as in equation (1), but not at the same rate for any given set of parameters. In fact, as 𝛽 
increases — the higher is 𝑃 — the smaller the impact Xt  has on Vt, becoming zero when 
𝛽 = 1. The intuition behind this is that when the perceived level of procedural fairness 
increases, agents can be more confident that a sacrifice in the short run economic 
outcome will be compensated by an increase of the intangible one. For example, if people 
trust the political decision-making process, it is easier for a government to implement free 
trade policies. On the contrary, if people are suspicious of the political system, there will 
be stronger pressure for protectionist policies. In other words, if 𝛽 = 0, electors only trust 
what they can see, meaning that they give all the weight to observable short-term 
economic outcome. 
 
This simple model fits well with a lot of what we know from the social psychological 
research on outcome favorability and procedural fairness. Even though people might 
prefer to maximize their utility from outcomes both in the short and the long run, “people 
may be willing to accept (and hence not be especially adversely affected by) unfavorable 
outcomes in the short term, provided that they believe that their outcomes will be at least 
reasonably favorable over the longer haul” (Brockner 2011: 237-238). Procedural 
fairness is thought to play a central role in this regard. As Brockner and Wiesenfeld put it, 
“procedures used to make resource allocation decisions usually are perceived to be 
relatively stable and enduring; consequently, people use information about procedures to 
make inferences about their longer term outcomes” (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996: 
193). In particular, “if procedures for decision-making and dispute resolution are fair, 
then it is reasonable to expect long-term gains, even in the absence of short-term gains” 
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(Lind and Tyler 1988: 224). Procedural fairness seems thus to increase individuals’ 
perception of the predictability of future outcomes, their optimism about their 
favorability, and even their ability to defer immediate gratification. The implication is a 
process-outcome interaction: “across a wide variety of studies, high procedural fairness 
has indeed been found to reduce the effect of outcome favorability on people’s support 
for decisions, decision-makers, and organizations, relative to when procedural fairness is 
low” (Brockner and Wiesenfield 2005: 548; see also Brockner and Wiesenfield 1996).3 
The same general point has been made by political theorists concerning political support: 
“authorities can require sacrifices from the public, and expect their decisions to be 
accepted, if they decide according to procedures the public views as fair” (Mansbridge 
1990: 175).4  
 
Empirical studies on political support have seldom sought support for these arguments, 
but there are a few exceptions. In what concerns the favorability of political outcomes, 
Dahlberg and Linde (2016) show that the “satisfaction with democracy” gap between 
“winners” and “losers” of elections becomes smaller the more the electoral process in the 
country is considered to be fair and the more the legal and judicial systems in the country 
adhere to norms of legal certainty, judicial independence, and corruption prevention. In 
other words, the impact of the difference between getting a favorable and unfavorable 
political outcome caused in citizens’ satisfaction seems to be dependent on procedural 
fairness perceptions. In what concerns the favorability of economic outcomes, Author 
(2016) shows that the relationship between evaluations of the current state of the 
economy and satisfaction with democracy in Europe is weaker when individuals believe 
that democratic political system they live under does conform to fundamental norms of 
procedural fairness (impartiality, standing, and trust). In another study, the relationship 
between objective indicators of economic performance on democratic satisfaction is 
significantly weaker in countries whose quality of governance is higher on the basis of 
                                                        
3 To be sure, the notion that the process-outcome interaction results from individuals discounting current 
benefits in exchange for future ones under high fairness conditions is still based on a fundamental self-
interested (or instrumental) model of procedural fairness. Other possible models are compatible with this 
interaction (see Brockner 2011 for a detailed review).  
4 See also Rosanvallon (2011:174). 
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expert and stakeholder surveys (Author forthcoming). In other words, procedural 
fairness clearly moderates the effects of economic outcomes on political support. 
 
Although this is not the central aspect of the paper, it is also useful to derive a few 
expectations from the model in terms of government action. Suppose that the government 
has two possible policies: 𝑔𝑋𝑡, which increases Xt, and 𝑔𝑋𝑇, which promotes XT. For 
example, 𝑔𝑋𝑡 can be a policy that reduces unemployment in the short run — such as 
government hiring employees — while 𝑔𝑋𝑇 is a policy that will in the long run decreases 
structural unemployment, like investing in education. Several assumptions could be made 
regarding cross effects, but we will assume that there are no spillover effects, neither 
positive nor negative.5 That means that Xt is simply a function of 𝑔𝑋𝑡, 𝑋𝑡(𝑔𝑋𝑡), and the 
same for XT. The government has limited resources, say M, i.e. faces a budget constraint 
of the type: 𝑔𝑋𝑡+𝑔𝑋𝑇≤M.
6 This constraint forces the government to choose how much 
weight is given to the present and to the future. An incumbent who wishes to maximize 
his electoral success will choose 𝑔𝑋𝑡 and 𝑔𝑋𝑇 in order to maximize Vt, which is the same 
as maximizing: 
max
𝑔𝑋𝑡,𝑔𝑋𝑇
  ln(𝑃) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑡(𝑔𝑋𝑡)) + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑇(𝑔𝑋𝑇))  
𝑠𝑡      𝑔𝑋𝑡 + 𝑔𝑋𝑇 ≤ 𝑀  
 
Under these conditions, this simple model predicts the lower the degree of procedural 
fairness — which implies a lower value of P, which, in turn, implies a lower level of β — 
the higher will be the government investment in Xt. In other words, an incumbent seeking 
reelection in a procedurally unfair environment will focus on short run policies,7 while 
countries where procedural fairness is a rule will pay more attention to long-term 
                                                        
5 This is obviously a simplifying assumption, as one can easily imagine policies that simultaneously 
promote short and long term growth. Still, for our purposes one can assume that the government only has 
relevant decision to take when it faces some kind of trade off — simply assume that policies that involve no 
tradeoff are already exhausted. One could also consider policies that involve a trade-off between the long 
and the short run, but those would only reinforce the implications of the example.  
6 To guarantee an interior solution, assume for 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑋𝑇  that 𝑋𝑡
′(. ) > 0 and 𝑋𝑇
′′(. ) < 0. 
7 This can easily be observed with a numerical example. Let M = 1; 𝑋𝑡(𝑔𝑋𝑡)=1-1/𝑔𝑋𝑡; and 𝑋𝑡(𝑔𝑋𝑇)=1-
1/𝑔𝑋𝑇. For β=0.9, we will find that the optimal policy mix will imply that 𝑋𝑡 =1.05 and 𝑋𝑇=2.49. If we 
consider a lower β, the government will devote more resources to the short run at the expense of the long 
run: for β=0.5, the optimal policy mix implies 𝑋𝑡 =2 and 𝑋𝑇=2. 
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outcomes. Taken together, these results suggest that we should expect a positive long run 
relation between procedural fairness and economic growth, which, in the short run, 
should not be obvious. In a country with low procedural fairness, with a government 
focusing on short run outcomes — with policies not grounded in long term outcomes —, 
the result should be higher levels of economic growth volatility.8  
 
The other basic expectations derived from the model, and the ones on which we will be 
focusing from now on, are the following: voter support for incumbents should be larger 
both when tangible economic outcomes are better and when governance institutions are 
more procedurally fair; moreover, procedural fairness should exert a moderating role in 
the effect of economic outcomes, with the relationship between tangible economic 
outcomes and incumbent support becoming smaller the higher the level of procedural 
fairness. This is what we will be testing in the next section. 
 
3. Economic voting and procedural fairness in the OECD countries, 1995-2005 
 
We examine a dataset covering elections in all OECD countries from 1995 to 2015. We 
include all elections in this period that directly (presidential in Chile, Mexico, South 
Korea, the United States) or indirectly (legislative elections in the remaining systems) 
contributed to the formation of the executive. Our dependent variable is, for each 
election, the % share of the vote of the parties that were in government at the time of that 
election (Incumbent vote share). In presidential elections, we consider the vote share of 
the candidate that was supported by the party of the incumbent president. To determine 
election date, Incumbent vote share, the % share of the vote of those same parties in the 
preceding election (Previous vote share), and all variables about cabinet composition, we 
use Döring and Manow’s ParGov database.9 
 
                                                        
8 There is supportive evidence for these implications. For example, while there seems to be a negative 
relationship between corruption and long-term growth (Akai, Oriuchi, and Sakata 2005), genuine wealth 
per capita (Aidt 2009), and other measures of sustainable development (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobaton 1999; Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson 2000), corruption is, at the very least, not an impediment to 
short-term growth (Pellegrini and Gerlach 2004; Svensson 2005). 
9 http://www.parlgov.org. For Chile, Mexico, and South Korea, we use Wikipedia. 
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We excluded a few elections in the OECD countries between 1995 and 2005, for 
different reasons. First, we do not include elections in countries that were not “Free” 
democracies at the time of the election, on the basis of Freedom House’s “Freedom in the 
World” country ratings.10 This leads to the exclusion of Turkey, as well as of elections in 
Mexico before 2000. Second, we exclude elections that took place after caretaker 
cabinets with non-partisan prime ministers had been in office for more than one year.11  
Third, several cases raise problems of measurement of Incumbent vote share. Those are 
the cases where parties listed as being part of the government at the time of the election 
did not run as such in that election, and either their successors or the parties they might 
have merged into could not be unambiguously identified in the Parlgov dataset.12 Fourth, 
in models where Previous vote share is employed as an independent variable, elections 
where any of the incumbent parties did not run for the preceding election and their 
eventual predecessors could not be unambiguously identified were excluded as well.13  
 
To capture both the direct and moderating effect of procedural fairness, we employ three 
alternative measures. Following previous studies on procedural fairness in governance —
Linde (2012), Linde and Erlingsson (2012) —, two of the measures we employ focus on 
the perceived prevalence of corruption. Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) is available for our countries since 1995, and captures 
perceptions of corruption in the public sector. Published yearly, CPI is based on data 
from a variety of institutional sources that monitor perceptions of the extent to which 
“any kind of abuse of entrusted power for private gain that takes place within the 
government or government bodies” occurs. Countries’ governments receive a score every 
                                                        
10 Available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-
2016%20%28FINAL%29_0.xlsx.  
11 This leads to the exclusion of the 1996, 2011, and 2013 elections in Italy, following the Dini, Amato, and 
Monti governments, and of the Czech 2010 election, following the Fischer government,  
12 For this reason, we excluded the 2003 elections in Belgium (PRL); the 2002 elections in France (RCV); 
the 2011 elections in Ireland (PD); the 2006 (NPSI and PRI), and 2008 (RI, PdCI, FdV, and PoUD) 
elections in Italy; the 1996 (Yiud), 2003 (MiHa), and 2013 (Haatz) elections in Israel; the 2007 elections in 
Korea; and the 1998 (KDS), 2002 (JP), and 2010 (JL and PS) elections in Latvia. As a result of this and the 
previous exclusion, Italy ends up not being included in our analyses. 
13 This led to the exclusion, in these models, of the 2011 elections in Switzerland (BDP), the 2006 elections 
in Israel (Kadima), the 2000 elections in Japan (NK and NCP), the 1995 elections in Estonia (VKR), and the 
1995 elections in Latvia (TPA). 
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year from 0 to 10, from most to least corrupt.14 In our sample, values range from 3.3 
(Mexico 2000 and 2006) to 10 (Denmark 1998), with a mean of 7.1 and a standard 
deviation of 1.8. We have no value for CPI for Iceland, Estonia, and Latvia, in 1995, or 
Slovenia in 1996, leading to the exclusion of those elections in models where that 
variable is employed.  
 
Alternatively, we also employ Control of Corruption (CoC), from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. CoC is an index combining up to 22 
different assessments and surveys, capturing perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. It is reported in standard 
normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values meaning lower 
corruption perceptions. It is available for most countries in the world from 1996 to 
2015.15 We coded each election in each country with the value of CoC. Between 1996 
and 2002, the data is biannual. Thus, for elections in 1997, 1999, and 2001, we use the 
mean of the preceding and successive year.16 Elections in 1995 are excluded.  
 
Finally, as a third alternative measure of procedural fairness in governance, we use 
Undue Influence. Scores for Undue Influence are obtained each year for the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, through their Executive Opinion 
Survey, capturing opinions of business leaders on two aspects: the extent to which the 
judicial system in each country is independent “from influences of the government, 
individuals, or companies” and the extent to which “government officials show 
favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and 
contracts”. We take independence from undue influences on the part of the judiciary and 
government officials to capture, again, the important dimension of “impartiality” in 
governance that is core to procedural fairness. Data is available since 2006.17 In our 
                                                        
14 For more info see http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. Starting in 2012, the published 
scores were rescaled from 0 to 100. In our data, we preserve the 0 to 10 scale. 
15 Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/wgidataset.xlsx 
16 In our sample, CoC ranges from -.41 (Mexico 2012) to 2.53 (Denmark 2007), with a mean of 1.4 and a 
standard deviation of .79. 
17 Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/GCI_Dataset_2006-2015.xlsx 
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sample, Undue Influence ranges from 2.39 (Slovakia 2010) to 6.26 (Sweden 2010), with 
a mean of 4.46 and a standard deviation of 1.05. CPI, CoC and Undue Influence are 
strongly intercorrelated in our sample, in all cases at above .90. 
 
Finally, our measure of short term economic performance is the growth rate of real GDP 
compared to the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted (GYSA), measured 
in the quarter preceding the one when the election took place. Data come from OECD 
statistics.18 In our sample, GYSA ranges from -8.4% (Greece in 2012) to 13% (Iceland in 
1999), with a mean of 2.6% and a standard deviation of 3.0%.  
 
We are using time-series, cross-section data (TSCS). Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 
(2014: 382), dealing with similar data, endorse the use of a linear cross-sectional time-
series model, including the Previous vote share (PVS) to address autocorrelation 
problems — note that using the Previous vote share is akin to the typical lagged 
dependent variable —, fixed effects through unit (country) dummies accounting for non-
observed heterogeneity and omitted variable bias, and panel corrected standard errors. 
However, we also present other results in Tables 1 and 2: the Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) 
approach to the analysis to TSCS data — OLS, PVS, and PCSE but without fixed effects, 
given risk of rejecting effects of slow moving variables; a random-effects model using 
the GLS estimator, estimating country cluster-robust standard errors, which allow for 
both heterocedasticity and autocorrelation; and a fixed effects model using the within 
regression estimator, also estimating country cluster-robust standard errors.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of models looking at the effects of GYSA, 
procedural fairness (CPI), and their interaction on the vote share of incumbent parties. As 
per equation (2), we expect both economic growth and our measure of procedural fairness 
to have a positive effect on incumbent vote share, but also that the effect of economic 
growth should become smaller as corruption perceptions decline (i.e., as procedural 
fairness increases). As we can see, in all estimations, both GYSA and procedural fairness 
do have a positive effect on incumbent vote share, and their interaction is negative and 
                                                        
18 Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350 
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statistically significant at, at least, p<.05. These results do not hinge on model 
specification or estimation strategy. Static or dynamic models and with or without fixed 
effects, our central expectation is confirmed: real GDP growth has a positive effect of the 
electoral performance of incumbent parties, but such effect is conditioned by the level of 
procedural fairness.  
 
 
Table 1. GDP growth, procedural fairness (Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency 
International) and the electoral performance of incumbent parties 
 
 
Variables 
FE 
PCSE 
PVS 
PCSE 
PVS 
RE FE  
GYSA 3.31*** 
(.54) 
2.40*** 
(.75) 
3.78*** 
 (1.06) 
3.67*** 
(1.15) 
 
Procedural fairness 5.69*** 
(1.27) 
2.26*** 
(.45) 
4.97*** 
(.93) 
7.78*** 
(1.44) 
 
Procedural 
fairness*GYSA 
-.36*** 
(.08) 
-.24** 
(.09) 
-.42*** 
(.13) 
-.42*** 
(.14) 
 
Previous vote share .54*** 
(.13) 
.90*** 
(.13) 
- -  
Constant -17.09 
(12.97) 
-19.04*** 
(4.34) 
4.85 
(6.43) 
-15.54 
(10.32) 
 
Fixed effects  YES NO NO YES  
Random effects NO NO YES NO  
Standard errors Panel 
corrected 
Panel 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
 
N elections 167 167 170 170  
N countries 33 33 33 33  
R2 .78 .65 .18 .16  
*p<.10; **p<.05;***p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimated marginal of GDP growth on the vote for the incumbent 
across the real range of values of CPI in the sample, based on the FE, PVS, PCSE 
estimation. As procedural fairness increases, the marginal effect of growth on the 
electoral performance of incumbent parties also decreases, to the point of becoming not 
significantly different from zero once CPI becomes larger than 8. 
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Figure 1. The estimated marginal effect of GDP growth on the share of votes for incumbent 
parties across the range of values of procedural fairness - CPI  
(based on the PCSE, PVS, FE estimation in Table 1). 
 
 
Moving to Table 2, we can see the results of the models estimated as in Table 1, but this 
time with our two alternative measures of procedural fairness. Given that CoC is only 
available since 1996 and Undue Influence since 2006, there is a decrease in the number of 
observations, especially when employing the latter. The main results, however, are 
remarkably similar to those obtained for Table 1: the effect of GDP growth is positive, 
and is conditioned by procedural fairness, with the impact of GYSA significantly 
decreasing as procedural fairness increases, regardless of the indicator employed. Figure 
2 illustrates. 
 
Table 2. GDP growth, alternative measures of procedural fairness, and the electoral performance of incumbent parties  
 Control of Corruption (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
World Bank) 
Undue Influence (Global Competitiveness Report, World 
Economic Forum) 
 
 
Variables 
FE 
PCSE 
PVS 
PCSE 
PVS 
RE FE FE 
PCSE 
PVS 
PCSE 
PVS 
RE FE 
GYSA 1.77*** 
(.36) 
1.44*** 
(.36) 
2.09*** 
(.62) 
1.96*** 
(.70) 
3.89*** 
(.89) 
2.89*** 
(.68) 
4.60*** 
(1.19) 
4.30*** 
(1.45) 
Procedural fairness 14.49*** 
(3.91) 
5.19*** 
(.80) 
9.85*** 
(2.31) 
15.09*** 
(4.21) 
11.72*** 
(2.19) 
4.27*** 
(.81) 
8.32*** 
(1.70) 
14.06*** 
(3.04) 
Procedural 
fairness*GYSA 
-.75*** 
(.19) 
-.55** 
(.21) 
-.95*** 
(.32) 
-.90** 
(.35) 
-.71*** 
(.19) 
-.47*** 
(.14) 
-.87*** 
(.24) 
-.82*** 
(.29) 
Previous vote share .63*** 
(.13) 
.88*** 
(.07) 
- - .58*** 
(.12) 
.87*** 
(.07) 
- - 
Constant -6.88 
(11.84) 
-9.24*** 
(.3.41) 
26.33*** 
(3.33) 
18.38*** 
(6.04) 
-39.66*** 
(11.34) 
-22.18*** 
(4.22) 
1.63 
(7.49) 
-24.76* 
(13.71) 
Fixed effects  YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES 
Random effects NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Standard errors Panel 
corrected 
Panel 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
Panel 
corrected 
Panel 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
Cluster 
corrected 
N elections 163 163 166 166 84 84 86 86 
N countries 33 33 33 33 31 31 31 31 
R2 .76 .65 .18 .17 .82 .70 .23 .20 
*p<.10; **p<.05;***p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. The estimated marginal effect of GDP growth on the share of votes for incumbent 
parties across the range of values of procedural fairness - CoC and Undue Influence 
(based on the PCSE, PVS, FE estimation in Table 1). 
 
3.2 Introducing other moderators 
  
Early on, we briefly discussed alternative explanations for the instability in economic 
voting in the political science literature. We should now present them in greater detail. 
The prevalent account focuses on the political and institutional conditions that can make 
responsibility for economic outcomes more or less diffuse: the more centralized and less 
encumbered by veto-points decision-making power is, the less difficult it is for voters to 
assign responsibility to incumbents for past outcomes, and the more informative are past 
outcomes about future competence. As a result, economic outcomes should be more 
strongly related with incumbent electoral performance. The evidence that the strength of 
economic voting rise as the “clarity of responsibility” also increases has been  
described as compelling (Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier 2013: 372-373). However, 
fragilities and comparability problems in this literature have also been pointed out (Duch 
and Stevenson 2008: 26; Anderson 2007: 283-285). There is no shortage of null findings 
in either observational (Chappell and Veiga 2000) or experimental (Sigelman et al. 1991) 
studies, of pervasive partisan biases and framing effects in citizens’ responsibility 
assignments (Hellwig and Coffey 2011; Bisgaard 2015), and even — fully contradicting 
expectations — of stronger economic voting under seemingly “lower clarity” contexts 
(Royed at al. 2000; Samuels and Hellwig 2010). In any case, we integrate this process by 
adding measures of “clarity of responsibility” to our basic model and testing for their 
interaction with GDP growth. 
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We employ three alternative measures. The first, Clarity I, stays as close as possible to 
Powell and Whitten’s (1993) original formulation. They employed an index coding 
countries and contexts with the value 1 in cases of lack of voting cohesion of the major 
governing party or parties, when a participatory and inclusive committee system exists in 
the legislature, when there is a bicameral opposition in a second chamber with significant 
policymaking powers, during minority governments, and during coalition governments. 
This resulted in an index ranging from 0 to 5, which was then dichotomized in the 
analysis, between high clarity (0-2) and low clarity (3-5) contexts. However, we were 
unable to collect unambiguous evidence about voting cohesion, the committee system, 
and bicameral opposition for all OECD countries and throughout the entire 1995-2015 
period. Thus, we employ here a simplified version of the Powell and Whitten measure, an 
index ranging from 0 to 2, assigning 1 point to each of the institutional features on which 
we have unambiguous data: minority governments and coalition governments. 0 
represents a single party majority cabinet, 1 a minority single party or a majority coalition 
cabinet, and 2 a minority coalition cabinet. The larger the value, the lower the clarity of 
responsibility for economic outcomes.  
 
Clarity II is taken from Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits (2016: 18): given that “the most 
widely accepted measure of the concept of clarity of responsibility is single-party 
majority control of government,” their indicator ranges from 30 to 100: “minority 
government, coded 30, indicates low clarity; coalition government, coded 60, 
corresponds to medium clarity; and single-party majority government, coded 100, 
indicates high clarity.” Finally, Clarity III is derived from Tavits (2007), and is 
constructed on the basis of the effective number of parties, the minority status of the 
government, and the length of incumbent time. More specifically, we follow Hicks et al. 
(2015): 
 
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
[1 − 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡)] + [1 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡] + 𝑆𝑡𝑑 (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
3
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ENPP denotes the effective number of parliamentary parties,19 Minority a dummy 
variable for whether the incumbent government is a minority cabinet, and Tenure the 
number of days before the elections during which the same party held the prime 
minister’s office. The Std function is a linear rescaling of each variable between 0 and 1, 
with 0 corresponding to the sample minimum and 1 to the maximum. Here, higher values 
mean higher clarity of responsibility. Sample values range from .12 (Netherlands 2012) 
to .91 (Luxembourg 2013). Switzerland was excluded in this analysis, since the rotative 
nature of the Federal President’s office renders the Tenure measure invalid. 
 
We also take into account other potential arguments about the instability of economic 
voting. Some still have to do with the possibility that economic voting should become 
weaker in contexts where governments have lower control over policy-making. For 
example, Anderson (2006) shows that economic voting is weaker in contexts where state 
and local governments enjoy larger fiscal autonomy. Conversely, Hellwig and Samuels 
(2007) show that the effect of economic performance on incumbent vote share is smaller 
in countries that are more exposed to international trade and with more open capital 
markets. Looking at other contextual factors, Hellwig (2010) finds, for example, that the 
impact of GDP growth is larger in younger democracies. And there is also evidence that 
the positive relationship between good economic performance and the vote holds 
foremost for left-wing parties, according to the “luxury goods” hypothesis (Stevenson 
2002; Kayser and Graftström 2016). 
 
We attempt to control for these processes by employing several different variables. Tax 
Decentralization is the percentage of local and state tax revenues as a percentage of the 
total general government tax revenue, taken from the OECD Fiscal Decentralization 
dataset.20 Data are available only until 2014 and not for Latvia. Trade Openness is the 
sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP, taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.21 Age of democracy is the 
                                                        
19 Taken from Gallagher (2016). 
20 Available at: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm#A_1. 
21 Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS. 
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number of consecutive years that a country has had a Polity score of 6 or higher up to the 
year of the election, on the basis of the Polity IV dataset.22 Finally, Left PM is a dummy 
variable coded 1 when the party of the prime minister is a left-wing party, on the basis of 
the Parlgov dataset (Switzerland excluded due to rotative nature of the Federal 
President’s office).  
 
In Table 3, we show estimations of models where GDP growth is interacted not only with 
procedural fairness (CPI), but also with each of the additional variables described above 
that are thought to moderate the effect of economic performance on incumbent vote. In 
the last three columns, we take the (admittedly extreme) step of modeling all these 
variables’ direct and moderation effects (using the alternative Clarity measures).  
                                                        
22 Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. For Iceland and Luxembourg, absent 
from the dataset, we considered 1944 and 1945, respectively, as the starting year. 
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Table 3. GDP growth, procedural fairness (CPI, Transparency International), and other variables as predictors and moderators of the electoral performance of incumbent 
parties (PCSE, PVS and country fixed effects). 
 Clarity I Clarity II Clarity III Tax 
decentralization 
Trade 
openness 
Age of 
democracy 
Left Prime 
Minister 
All (using 
Clarity I) 
All (using 
Clarity II) 
All (using 
Clarity III) 
GYSA 3.45*** 
(.53) 
6.11*** 
(1.16) 
4.44*** 
(.87) 
3.23*** 
(.59) 
3.23*** 
(.53) 
2.99*** 
(.45) 
2.71*** 
(.60) 
2.38*** 
(.56) 
5.03*** 
(1.16) 
3.37*** 
(.80) 
Procedural fairness 6.05*** 
(1.25) 
6.24*** 
(1.19) 
5.44*** 
(1.28) 
5.68*** 
(1.07) 
6.10*** 
(1.33) 
5.60*** 
(1.24) 
5.37*** 
(1.21) 
6.15*** 
(1.25) 
6.31*** 
(1.22) 
5.57*** 
(1.19) 
Procedural fairness*GYSA -.47*** 
(.11) 
-.51*** 
(.10) 
-.33*** 
(.06) 
-.38*** 
(.09) 
-.35*** 
(.07) 
-.22*** 
(.07) 
-.29*** 
(.07) 
-.41* 
(.21) 
-.46** 
(.19) 
-.26* 
(.14) 
Clarity 
 
-1.66 
(1.90) 
.06* 
(.03) 
6.99 
(5.13) 
- - - - -2.49 
(2.13) 
.08* 
(.04) 
8.29 
(6.04) 
Clarity*GYSA 
 
.73* 
(.41) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-2.03*** 
(1.02) 
- - - - .83* 
(.43) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-1.97* 
(1.08) 
Tax Decentralization - - - -.63*** 
(.24) 
- - - -.73*** 
(.27) 
-.70** 
(.28) 
.04 
(.03) 
Tax Decentralization *GYSA - - - .01 
(.02) 
- - - .05* 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
Trade Openness - - - - 
 
-.06** 
(.03) 
- - -.09** 
(.04) 
-.09** 
(.04) 
-.09** 
(.04) 
Trade Openness*GYSA - - - - 
 
-.001 
(.002) 
- - .002 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.003 
(.004) 
Age of democracy - - - - 
 
- -.07 
(.09) 
- .15 
(.13) 
.16 
(.14) 
.17 
(.14) 
Age of democracy*GYSA - - - - - -.01** 
(.007) 
- -.01 
(.007) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01** 
(.007) 
Left PM - - - - 
 
- - -.82 
(1.03) 
-2.52** 
(1.16) 
-2.28** 
(1.08) 
-1.98* 
(1.06) 
Left PM* GYSA - - - - 
 
- - .39 
(.34) 
.89** 
(.37) 
.82** 
(.36) 
.70** 
(.35) 
Previous vote share .53*** 
(.12) 
.53*** 
(.12) 
.51*** 
(.13) 
.61*** 
(.16) 
.54*** 
(.13) 
.54*** 
(.12) 
.54*** 
(.13) 
.56*** 
(.15) 
.55*** 
(.16) 
.52*** 
(.16) 
Constant -17.65 
(12.63) 
-.24.02* 
(12.76) 
-17.54 
(12.55) 
-.17.72 
(13.58) 
-.14.06 
(12.30) 
-12.29 
(12.32) 
-14.14 
(13.22) 
-14.28 
(13.23) 
-21.97* 
(13.29) 
-16.69 
(13.09) 
N elections 167 167 161 152 167 167 161 147 147 146 
N countries 33 33 32 32 33 33 32 31 31 31 
R2 .78 .79 .71 .78 .78 .78 .70 .74 .74 .74 
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Two results stand out. The first is that, once we take into account the direct and 
moderating effect of procedural fairness (as well as of other processes), the results for 
all different Clarity measures are actually the opposite of what is most commonly 
assumed. Second, and the main point of the analysis, regardless of the additional 
moderation processes we take into account in modeling the data, the interaction 
between GYSA and procedural fairness is always negative and statistically significant.  
 
3.3 Employing survey data 
The time-series cross-section data employed so far raise a number of important 
questions in terms of analysis. Our “panel” includes a different number of elections 
occurring at different points in time in different countries. Inclusion of previous vote 
share, akin to a lagged dependent variable, and the use of fixed effects models in this 
kind of data, remain debated options, and no easy fixes for the problems thus raised 
seem to be available (Wilson and Butler 2007). We have not used the terminology of 
“lagged dependent variable” because the fact is that we are not following the same 
incumbents over time — only in less than 40% of the cases the previous vote share 
would coincide with the lagged dependent variable —, which prevents us from 
estimating proper dynamic panel models (which, by themselves, also pose several 
estimation challenges). We did employ different estimation strategies to assure 
ourselves of the robustness of the results. But somewhat more can be done in that 
regard. 
 
One possibility is to resort to microlevel data — i.e, particularly data from post-
election surveys where the question of vote recall (for the incumbent instead of an 
opposition party) has been posed — to test the same hypotheses. In this particular 
case, we use data from Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
project.23 Of the 34 OCDE countries that are “Free” democracies, 24 have 
participated in CSES Module 1. Of these, we are able to use a total of 23 surveys in 
21 countries.24 The elections and the post-election surveys all took place between 
                                                        
23 Available at: http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module1/module1.htm. 
24 CSES’s module 1 survey in South Korea measures with voting recall on legislative rather than 
presidential elections, while in Chile it deals with first rather than second round presidential vote. We 
also dropped Slovenia, given that we have no CPI measure for 1996, the date of the election covered in 
CSES. Belgium was divided into two surveys, in Flanders and Walonia, which in practice display two 
different party systems, while two surveys were conducted after two different Spanish elections. 
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1996 and 2000. In each survey, we recoded the response to the vote recall question 
into a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent reported having voted for any of the 
incumbent parties and 0 otherwise. We are therefore interested in determining if 
voters in elections whose economies had experienced greater GDP growth in the 
previous year are more likely to vote for the incumbent parties and, crucially, whether 
that effect is significantly smaller in contexts where procedural fairness is higher.  
 
Since data about these voters is clustered by election/survey and the dependent 
variable is binary, we employ a mixed effects logistic regression. The main 
independent variables are, as before, GYSA and procedural fairness (CPI). Since we 
are obviously unable to employ a country fixed-effects specification and have a very 
limited number of macro-level units, we are forced to be quite parsimonious regarding 
controls at that level. However, we take into account two fundamental features, one 
socio-economic and another political: GDP per capita (in thousands of 2010 
international dollars), to control for fundamental differences between levels of socio-
economic development; and Age of democracy. Furthermore, we include several 
individual-level controls: a dummy variable for Female respondents; Education (an 
eight-point ordinal scale from 1 — None — to 8 — University undergraduate degree 
completed); Age; Income (from the lowest — 1 — to the highest — 5 — income 
quintile); and, most importantly, two dummy variables were created capturing voters’ 
partisan predispositions, in particular, whether respondents feel close to any of the 
incumbent — Close to incumbent — or any of the opposition — Close to opposition 
— parties, with the reference category being not being close to any party. Table 4 
shows the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mixed effects logistic regression of vote for the incumbent (CSES, module 1, OECD 
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countries) 
Country/election characteristics  
GYSA .65** 
(.29) 
Procedural fairness (CPI) .04 
(.19) 
GYSA*Procedural fairness (CPI) -.06* 
(.07) 
GDP per capita .04** 
(.02) 
Age of democracy .002 
(.003) 
Respondent characteristics  
Closeness to incumbent party 2.77*** 
(.05) 
Closeness to opposition party -2.16*** 
(.06) 
Female .02 
(.03) 
Age .002** 
(.001) 
Education -.04*** 
(.01) 
Income .08*** 
(.01) 
Constant -2.78*** 
(1.00) 
Country/election level variance .25 
N elections 23 
N respondents 28,304 
*p<.10; **p<.05;***p<.01 
 
The greater the economic growth before an election, the more likely are respondents 
in that country to report having voted for one of the incumbent parties rather than for 
one of the opposition parties, controlling for partisanship and other individual-level 
features. Furthermore, the strength of that relationship between economic 
performance and the propensity to vote for incumbents depends on the corruption 
perceptions score in that election year. From the model in Table 4, and at the 
minimum level of CPI (3.3) in this sample of countries, once all other variables are 
kept constant at their mean values, one additional point in GDP growth is estimated to 
increase the probability of voting for one of the incumbent parties instead of an 
opposition party by about 6 percentage points. However, as we can see in Figure 3, 
that effect diminishes as CPI increases and becomes not significantly different from 
zero at levels of CPI close to 9.  
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Figure 3. The estimated marginal effect of GDP growth on the probability of voting for 
incumbent parties across the real range of values of procedural fairness (CPI) 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Social psychologists have long described and established the existence of an 
interactive relationship between outcome favorability and procedural fairness in 
determining our reactions to events and decisions in workplaces, courts, and many 
other organizational contexts. It’s not just that people care both about what they get 
and how they get it, i.e., both about outcome favorability and procedural fairness. It’s 
also that “people’s tendencies to respond better when their outcomes are more 
favorable is reduced when process fairness is high rather than low” (Brockner 2010: 
xvii). However, although the experimental and observational evidence supporting this 
moderation effect of procedural fairness in micro and meso contexts is nothing short 
of overwhelming, it has very seldom been extended to macro contexts, particularly 
those of people’s relationships with political authorities.  
 
In this paper, we suggest this extension is warranted and supported by evidence. Most 
importantly, it can help providing a relevant answer to a lingering problem in the 
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study of political support: the fact that the relationship between economic outcomes 
and the vote for incumbent parties is unstable across elections and countries. One of 
the sources of that instability, we argue, is the fact that economic voting is 
conditioned by the extent to which voters perceive governmental decision-making to 
be procedurally fair. If electors perceive governance to abide to criteria such as 
consistency, impartiality, and ethicality, short-term economic outcomes should play a 
smaller role in driving support for authorities. To illustrate a possible mechanism 
behind this, we wrote down a very simple mathematical voting function. In this 
function, voters care about procedural fairness, short run economic performance and 
an intangible good, which can be interpreted as promoting long run economic 
development. The higher the procedural fairness, the higher the trust that the 
government is devoting its resources to the intangible good and that future outcomes 
will be favorable. As a result, if fairness increases, voters will tolerate better a lower 
short run economic performance in exchange for the harder to observe investment in 
the tangible good. 
 
We used a dataset covering elections in the OECD economies from 1995 to 2015, and 
employ a simple measure of short term economic performance (real GDP growth) and 
three alternative measures of procedural fairness, two focusing on corruption 
perceptions and another on the independence and impartiality of public officials. Our 
results are in line with our predictions: while GDP growth is important to explain the 
electoral success of the incumbent parties, it is less important in countries with lower 
levels of perceived corruption. Moreover, at the highest levels of procedural fairness, 
GDP growth ceases to be relevant to explain incumbents’ success.  
 
Previous literature has explored the possibility that other variables moderate the effect 
of economic growth. We did the same. While many studies have supported the clarity 
of responsibility hypothesis, there is no shortage of null findings. In fact, some studies 
even report results that directly contradict the basic theory, and our findings point 
precisely in that direction. In contrast, regardless of the specific moderation processes 
we look at, the type of data employed, and estimation strategies, the results supporting 
our hypothesis remain very robust: economic growth is an important variable to 
explain the electoral outcomes of the incumbent parties, but its importance decreases 
in countries with higher levels of procedural fairness. Thus, the way outcomes and 
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processes affect support in the realm of politics and elections seems to be very similar 
to the way they affect support for authorities and satisfaction with social exchanges in 
other dimensions of social and organizational life. 
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